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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-3996
KORI TANUASIH TANUDIDJAJA;
BAMBANG HERY,
    Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA Nos. A79-326-394 and A79-326-395
(U.S. Immigration Judge: Honorable Donald V. Ferlise)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 8, 2006
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, McKEE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Filed:   November 21, 2006)
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
     1 Tanudidjaja’s husband, Bambang Hery, did not file his own application for asylum,
and was consequently only considered a derivative party on her application for asylum.
2
Kori Tanuasih Tanudidjaja petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ August 2, 2005, order affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of her
application for asylum.  We will deny the petition.
I. 
Tanudidjaja, a native and citizen of Indonesia who identifies herself as an “ethnic
Chinese,” entered the United States in November 2000 on a temporary visa that expired
in May 2001.  In July 2001, she applied for asylum, claiming she had suffered past
persecution in Indonesia on account of her ethnicity and religious beliefs.1  Her first
affidavit was appended to that application.  In August 2001, she was served by the INS
with a notice to appear charging she had overstayed the term of her visa and was
removable from the United States.  Tanudidjaja conceded her removability, and submitted
a second affidavit in support of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
withholding under the Convention Against Torture.  After a hearing at which Tanudidjaja
testified, the IJ denied her application in a February 24, 2004, oral decision, finding she
lacked credibility and, alternatively, had failed to make a sufficient case of persecution to
receive asylum.  The IJ ordered Tanudidjaja removed to Indonesia.
Among other evidence, the IJ considered Tanudidjaja’s two affidavits, her
testimony, and a State Department report on Indonesia.  Tanudidjaja contended she had
been discriminated against in her studies and her employment, had been robbed on at least
     2 We denied the motion for stay of removal in a November 17, 2005, order.
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three occasions, and had been the victim of attempted arson—all on account of her
ethnicity.  She also contended she and her husband had been the targets of violence on
account of their ethnicity and religion.  In his oral decision, the IJ noted several
inconsistencies among the first and second affidavits and Tanudidjaja’s testimony,
particularly her varying accounts of riots in 1998 and an occasion on which she contends
individuals attempted to set fire to her house.  He also noted her failure ever to mention in
her first affidavit that she had held a prayer meeting at her house outside of which
demonstrators had protested.  Additionally, the IJ found unconvincing Tanudidjaja’s
explanations for why she had never reported to the Indonesian police any of the incidents
she described.  He concluded Tanudidjaja’s application lacked credibility.  The IJ further
concluded Tanudidjaja had not presented sufficient evidence to show she had ever been
persecuted in the past on account of her ethnicity or religion, or to establish a well-
founded fear of persecution.
Tanudidjaja appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  The BIA affirmed without
opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) on August 2, 2005, rendering the IJ’s decision the
final BIA determination.  Tanudidjaja filed this petition for review, along with a motion
for stay of removal pending its resolution, on August 25, 2005.2
The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). 
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
4Where the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without opinion under 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(e), we review the IJ’s decision.  Partyka v. Attorney General, 417 F.3d 408, 411
(3d Cir. 2005).  We review legal determinations de novo, subject to established principles
of deference.  Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).  Under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B), “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Factual findings must be
upheld if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.”  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).  This
substantial evidence standard applies to determinations whether an alien has experienced
or has a well-founded fear of persecution, see Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483–84
(3d Cir. 2001), as well as adverse credibility determinations, see Gao v. Ashcroft, 299
F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).
II.
Tanudidjaja contends the IJ’s “pure suspicion” of contradictions between her
testimony and affidavits was not an adequate basis for denying her asylum application. 
An applicant has the burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  The applicant may satisfy the
burden through his or her own credible testimony.  Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123,
133 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 208.16).  “In making an adverse credibility
determination, the IJ must provide ‘specific, cogent reason[s]’ why the applicant is not
credible.”  Gabuniya v. Attorney General, 463 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2006) (alteration in
5original).  If contradictory testimony is the basis of the adverse credibility determination,
minor inconsistencies are insufficient; rather, “[t]he discrepancies must involve the ‘heart
of the asylum claim.’”  Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2004).  Here, the
IJ specifically enumerated the reasons for his adverse credibility determination:
inconsistencies and a lack of sufficient explanation why Tanudidjaja failed to report any
incidents to the Indonesian police.  The inconsistencies noted by the IJ between
Tanudidjaja’s two affidavits and her testimony involved the specific incidents that formed
the bases of her contention she had been persecuted on account of her ethnicity and
religion, the heart of her asylum claim.  For instance, the IJ noted Tanudidjaja had failed
to mention any prayer meeting in her first affidavit.  We conclude the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence.
Tanudidjaja also contends the IJ erred in refusing to grant her asylum, because she
had shown she had suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of persecution if
she should return to Indonesia.  An applicant seeking asylum on the basis of past
persecution must show: (1) one or more incidents that rise to the level of persecution; (2)
that occurred because of his or her membership in a statutorily-protected class; and (3)
that were committed by the government or by forces the government was either unable or
unwilling to control.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003). 
The IJ found, even assuming arguendo that Tanudidjaja had been credible, that she and
her husband had been “victims of street crimes, hooliganism and . . . riots that were
widespread through Indonesia,” but that “[n]one of the crimes that were committed
     3 The IJ also found Tanudidjaja had failed to establish eligibility for restriction on
removal, which requires the applicant to show it is more likely than not that he or she
would be subject to persecution if removed.  Because we conclude the IJ’s determination
Tanudidjaja failed to establish eligibility for asylum was supported by substantial
evidence, it follows the IJ’s determination under the more rigorous standard was also
supported by substantial evidence.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469–70 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“[I]f an alien fails to establish the well-founded fear of persecution required
for a grant of asylum, he or she will, by definition, have failed to establish the clear
probability of persecution required for withholding of deportation.”).
6
against [Tanudidjaja] had its genesis in [her] race, religion, nationality, [or] membership
in a particular social group or political opinion.”  In order to establish a well-founded fear
of persecution, an applicant for asylum must “show that he has a subjective fear of
persecution that is supported by objective evidence that persecution is a reasonable
possibility.”  Abdille, 242 F.3d at 496.  The IJ found there was no evidence the Indonesian
government persecutes Chinese or Catholics, and that Tanudidjaja had failed to establish
a well-founded fear of persecution.  We conclude the IJ’s finding Tanudidjaja failed to
establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution was supported by substantial evidence.3 
III.
We will deny the petition for review.
